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Introduction 
Many practices in agriculture are regulated and must be approved by statutory authorities 
before they can be undertaken legally. Regulation is intended to ensure that risks from 
agriculture to human and animal health and to the environment are kept to an acceptable 
level. The acceptability of risk may be judged relative to the potential benefits of the practice 
or against an absolute standard.  Among regulated activities are the use of synthetic 
chemical crop-protection products (pesticides1) (Handford et al. 2015) and genetically 
engineered (GE) seeds (McHughen 2012). Use of biological pesticides, such as pathogens 
of crop pests, and seeds produced without using genetic engineering (“conventional” seeds) 
are also regulated in many countries. 
Regulatory approvals are granted for specific uses of individual products over a limited time. 
An approval to use a given crop-protection product may stipulate many conditions, including 
the permitted crops and application methods, the maximum amount of the product that may 
be applied, restrictions on the number, timing and sites of application, and any protective 
equipment that must be worn while using the product (Müller et al. 2014). Conditions for use 
of GE seeds may restrict where they are grown in order to limit cross-fertilisation with non-
GE crops (Devos et al. 2009) or, in the case of insect-resistant crops, to delay the evolution 
of resistance in the targeted pests (Tabashnik 2013).   
Whether the use of a product is regulated, and the form any regulation takes, often depends 
on the process by which the product is produced rather than on the effect it intended to 
achieve. Such “process-based” regulation can lead to products with similar properties being 
treated very differently. The replacement of synthetic chemical pesticides by biological 
pesticides, for example, is encouraged in many countries, and leads to decision-making over 
biological pesticides being simpler and quicker than for synthetic pesticides (Balog et al. 
2017). This is the case despite some biological pesticides being less well characterised and 
having greater ability to persist and spread in the environment than is the case for synthetic 
pesticides (Chandler et al. 2008).  
Similar situations are found in the seed industry. The main reason for regulating the use of 
conventional seeds is protection of plant breeders’ rights (Brahmi and Chaudhary 2011); 
therefore, regulation focuses on whether a new conventional variety is distinct from older 
varieties, as well as its being uniform and stable (Yan et al. 2015), rather than whether use of 
the new variety poses unacceptable risk. Thus, there is no pre-market regulatory requirement 
to assess the risks to human health and the environment from, say, the cultivation of a 
herbicide-tolerant crop produced by conventional breeding – although its developers may 
choose to conduct such an assessment for their own purposes. An extensive risk 
assessment would be required in order to commercialise a GE crop designed to be tolerant 
to the same herbicide (Hérouet et al. 2005). An exception is Canada, where regulatory risk 
assessment for seeds is triggered by their possessing a trait that is new to the species, 
                                                          
1 Strictly, a pesticide is a substance that controls any pest; a crop-protection or plant-protection product is a 
formulation of a pesticide designed to control pests of crops 
regardless of how that new trait was produced (Macdonald 2014); this is an example of 
“product-based” regulation. 
Regulation imposes significant costs on the developers of regulated products and on society 
generally. The cost of developing a new synthetic pesticide was estimated recently to be US 
$286 million, a 55% increase since 2000 when the cost was US $184 million. Roughly 12% 
of the development cost is for pesticide registration; however, a further 25% is for toxicology 
and environmental chemistry studies that comprise much of the evidence to support 
applications to register product uses (Sparks and Lorsbach 2017). The increasing cost of 
development, along with less predictability in regulatory decision-making, means that fewer 
companies can develop new pesticides and that new products are targeted at large markets 
in order to recoup the costs of development. These trends inevitably lead to less innovation 
targeted at small, niche markets (Maienfisch and Stevenson 2015). The consequences of 
these economic pressures are uncertain. However, one is likely to be less diversity in 
cropping systems if products that allowed the economic production of certain crops become 
obsolete and cannot be replaced. Lower diversity may lead to greater vulnerability to 
environmental changes such as the evolution of new pests and pathogens. 
Use of crop-protection products provides numerous benefits to human wellbeing. Potential 
loss of crop yield to damage by pests is estimated to be 50–80% by crop, but actual losses 
are about 25–40% owing to the use of control methods that include pesticides (Oerke and 
Dehne 2004). Reducing yield losses has many associated benefits, including increased food 
security and safety, improved livelihoods for farmers and reducing pressure to cultivate more 
land (Cooper and Dobson 2007). Maintaining and extending these benefits is a key aim of 
research and development (R&D) in the crop-protection industry. A second, and equally 
important, aim is to reduce or eliminate harmful side-effects resulting from the use or misuse 
of crop-protection products. An ideal pesticide would be effective only against pests and be 
harmless to non-pests even if misused, it would be applied precisely to where the pest 
occurs, it would not move away from the application site, it would disappear once it had 
provided its intended effect and evolution of resistance in pests would take years or even 
decades. A good regulatory system ought to encourage such innovation (Mittra et al. 2014). 
However, it is unlikely that current trends in the regulation of synthetic pesticides will lead to 
such as system (Shaner and Beckie 2014).  
Improvements to the mode-of-action and formulation of synthetic pesticides, genetic 
engineering of crops, and newer techniques such as RNA-interference (RNAi), synthetic 
biology and gene editing, put many of the attributes of the ideal crop protection product within 
reach. However, regulation of research, and proposed regulation of products of that 
research, is restricting innovation based on these methods (Tait and Barker 2011). Hence, 
regulation designed to reduce risk may increase risk by delaying or preventing the 
introduction of products that are less hazardous and persistent than those they would 
replace. 
A similar story may be told in the seeds industry. Society increasingly demands a reliable 
supply of nutritious food produced according to high ethical standards. These demands must 
be fulfilled without using more land, water or energy than at present, and in the face of 
predicted changes to the world’s climate and human population, while providing profitable 
business for farmers and supporting rural economies. Crops produced by new breeding 
techniques offer solutions to some of the problems raised by these demands (Godfray et al. 
2010), and GE crops are already contributing to the environmental and economic 
sustainability of farming (Brookes and Barfoot 2017a, 2017b).  However, as in crop 
protection, regulation, particularly if based on current methods for regulating GE crops, may 
stifle the required innovation (Raybould and Poppy 2012; Smyth 2017).    
In this article, I examine the relationship between societal demands of its food production 
systems and the sometimes vehement opposition to use of technology that has great 
potential to meet such demands. I first look at why new technologies are needed in R&D in 
the crop-protection and industry. I then look at problems that arise in attempting to regulate 
the use of products of new technology and the effects that these problems on our industry’s 
ability to provide useful new products. Finally, I examine how current regulation of new 
technology should evolve to encourage rather than oppose innovation, and what the role of 
industry should be in this process. I suggest that industry needs to change from emphasising 
regulatory compliance and the dire consequences if products of new technology are not 
used, to offering a compelling vision of how new technology will help society to design 
agricultural systems that retain the benefits of intensive production while eliminating the 
effects that are profoundly disliked by many people.       
The need for technological innovation in agriculture 
After the Second World War, agricultural policy in many parts of the world led to the 
development of “industrial” farming systems for producing food. Use of mechanisation, 
synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, irrigation and modern crop varieties led to an almost 
doubling of world food production – measured as the yield of cereals, coarse grains and root 
crops – between 1961 and 1996 (Tilman 1999). These production methods also led to 
environmental problems, including loss of biodiversity, pollution of soil, water and air, soil 
erosion and unsustainable use of water (Horrigan et al. 2002). The diets of many people in 
developing countries were improved during this period (Evenson and Gollin 2003), while 
some aspects of diet, for example the greater consumption of fats implicated in causing 
chronic disease, may have worsened in developed countries (Horrigan et al. 2002). These 
benefits and harms are still relevant today (Bardgett and Gibson 2017). 
Deciding whether the results of agricultural policies over the last 70 years have on balance 
been good or bad is fearsomely complicated. First, one must define good and bad. Secondly, 
one must choose what changes to include in the analysis; this difficult because agriculture is 
so widespread and food is so fundamental to human existence that agricultural policy could 
be implicated in virtually any environmental or societal change. Then, one must compare 
actual changes wrought by agriculture with the counterfactual of predicted changes that 
would have happened under different policies (e.g., Evenson and Gollin 2003; Stevenson et 
al. 2013). Finally, one must find a way to value disparate consequences in ways that allow 
direct comparison. How, for example, should one weigh improvements to human nutrition 
against loss of biodiversity?  
The difficulty in deciding with hindsight whether post-war agricultural policies were good or 
bad illustrates a fundamental aspect of solving problems: all solutions have unforeseen 
consequences that produce new problems. That problems are unforeseen in some respects 
makes decision-making easier than analysing the consequences of a decision. If agricultural 
policymakers in the 1940s and 1950s knew what we know now about the disparate 
consequences of industrial agriculture, their ability to make decisions would have been 
overwhelmed by complexity 
Because of unforeseen consequences, knowing that one has made the correct decision – 
the one that best achieves one’s objectives and has fewest harmful side-effects – is often 
impossible. In such circumstances, the rational objective ought to be to react effectively to 
change and minimise the unexpected harms and maximise the unexpected benefits of 
whatever decision we make (Miller 2003). A glib reason, then, for justifying the development 
of new technology is that we may need it in order to solve the problems caused by older 
technology. Indeed, opponents of the use technology in agriculture have argued that 
problems of food security are best solved by changes in economic and social policies 
because “technological fixes” are temporary and create a vicious circle: use of technology 
begets problems that lead to the use of more technology to try to solve them, thereby 
creating bigger problems and more use of technology (Pavone et al. 2011; Scott 2011). This 
argument is regularly applied against the development of new pesticides to overcome the 
resistance of pests to older pesticides, and has been dubbed “the pesticide treadmill” 
(Nicholls and Altieri 1997). 
Critics imply that using agricultural technology worsens situations by delaying removal of the 
ultimate social and economic causes of food insecurity. This view seems mistaken on 
philosophical and humanitarian grounds. First, social and economic change is just as likely 
as the use of technology to produce unforeseen harmful effects. Secondly, there is no sharp 
distinction between socioeconomics and technology use. It is difficult to envisage relevant 
policy change that would not require use of technology in its implementation, just as it is 
difficult to think of uses of technology that have no socioeconomic implications. Finally, rather 
than making problems worse by postponing social or economic solutions, using technology 
may improve matters by alleviating immediate suffering that could otherwise force politicians’ 
hands to adopt measures with longer term negative consequences (see Chapter X in this 
volume). In essence, improved technology can buy time while social and political 
improvements are considered. 
The case for the continued development and use of agricultural technology is not an 
argument for technology per se, or a denial of the political, social and moral nature of human 
problems, as some critics claim (Marx 1983; Pavone et al. 2011). It is an argument that new 
agricultural technology is likely to be necessary in order to achieve the moral and ethical 
objective of feeding 9–10 billion people adequately in a manner that is socially, economically 
and environmentally acceptable. In addition, following Miller (2003), we must recognise that 
the successful use of new technology to solve problems in agriculture has inevitably created 
new problems. Using new technology to solve these problems does not imply that we are on 
a technology treadmill, merely that there are no perfect solutions to complicated problems.    
It is convenient to portray developers of agricultural technology as regarding the provision of 
sufficient food as a purely technical problem because it allows opponents of technology to 
avoid describing the consequences of other options. Indeed, opponents of agricultural 
technologies seem to fall into a trap that mirrors the one they the one they describe: 
problems are not political, social and moral, but are the result of technology and could be 
solved by using less technology – what could be described as an “anti-technological fix” 
(Raybould and Poppy 2012). 
Opportunities for regulated technologies in crop protection and plant breeding 
There is a wide variety of new technologies that could lead to improvements in crop 
production. Of particular current interest is the use of big data and drones and other robotics 
in “precision agriculture”: precise seed sowing and timely, accurate application of fertilisers, 
pesticides and other inputs in the smallest amounts for efficacy (Wolfert et al. 2017; King 
2017; van Evert et al. 2017). These developments should not only increase crop productivity, 
cut pollution, reduce unwanted environmental impacts, reduce the amount of land required to 
produce enough food, but also save energy by reducing application and production of energy 
intensive nitrogen fertilisers.  Also, advances in nucleic acid sequencing and genetic analysis 
will increase the speed of conventional plant breeding and broaden the range of phenotypes 
that breeders are able to produce (Varshney et al. 2016). While products of these 
technologies would have to comply with relevant laws and standards in the countries where 
they are used, they are unlikely to need specific regulatory approvals of the kind that are 
required currently for crop-protection products and GE seeds. 
Despite the undoubted potential of these unregulated technologies, innovation of regulated 
products for crop production is still being undertaken and is likely to continue for many years. 
Pesticides and GE crops will continue to be regulated, and it is likely that the products of at 
least some new plant-breeding techniques (NBTs), such as gene editing, will also be 
regulated (Wolt et al. 2016). Here, I will briefly summarise the kinds of products that R&D in 
pesticides, GE crops and NBTs may produce in the next few years. 
A fundamental objective of R&D in crop production is to increase the productivity of individual 
plants. One way to achieve this is by increasing the yield potential of crops by genetically 
engineering photosynthesis to be more efficient. Increasing the efficiency of photosynthetic 
enzymes and changing plant architecture so that more sunlight reaches lower leaves are 
among the strategies being explored (Long et al. 2015; see Chapter Y). Innovation in 
chemicals that alter plant growth will also help to improve the efficiency of photosynthesis in 
crops; nanoparticles are one line of research in this field (Tripathi et al. 2016). 
Another important aim of plant breeding is to increase the tolerance of crops to abiotic 
stressors, such as flood, drought, high temperatures and salinity (See Chapter Z). The ability 
of crops to cope with these conditions will become increasingly important as the climate 
changes and water for agriculture becomes scarcer. Various genetic engineering approaches 
to increasing stress tolerance have been used. Most involve the addition of one or a few 
genes that lead to the production of sugars or proteins that protect plant cells under 
conditions that would otherwise cause cellular damage and kill or severely damage the crop. 
However, these relatively simple approaches often lead to adverse effects to the plant’s 
phenotype owing to side-effects on metabolic pathways that control plant growth and 
development. More sophisticated synthetic biology approaches will allow engineering of 
whole metabolic pathways to improve stress tolerance without adversely affecting pathways 
that control plant growth and development (Cabello et al. 2014). Similar results may be 
obtained by treating crops with chemicals that prime them to activate faster and stronger 
protection mechanisms when growth conditions become unfavourable (Savvides et al. 2016). 
Genetic engineering and NBTs may also contribute to precision agriculture. Improving 
nitrogen-use efficiency of crops is of particular interest in order to save energy and reduce 
pollution from ineffective application of nitrogen fertiliser (Galloway 1998). Numerous genes 
have been suggested as targets for modification, including those controlling nitrogen uptake, 
assimilation, amino acid biosynthesis and plant senescence (McAllister et al. 2012). Genetic 
engineering of root architecture also has potential to improve nitrogen-use efficiency. Many 
other traits are also possible through changing root architecture, including increased water-
use efficiency and nutrient uptake, and better interactions with soil microbes (Meister et al. 
2014). 
Regulated technologies will continue to be vital in protecting crops from pests and disease by 
developing products that are applied in small amounts, do not persist in the environment or in 
crops, and have fewer adverse effects on species that are not pests.  Genetic engineering 
has already contributed significantly to these aims through the development of maize and 
cotton that produce insecticidal proteins derived from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt). Bt toxins have narrow spectrums of activity, providing effective control of insect pests 
while leaving other organisms unharmed (Romeis et al. 2006). The toxins are produced 
precisely where they are needed – in tissues of the crop – and they tend not to persist and 
accumulate in soil even after several years of continuous cultivation of a Bt crop (Gruber et 
al. 2012). Following their first commercial use in 1996, Bt crops have provided numerous 
economic and environmental benefits, including reduced use of broad-spectrum pesticides 
(Brookes and Barfoot 2017a, 2017b). 
R&D continues on the genetic engineering of insecticidal proteins in crops. Maize and cotton 
that produce more than one Bt toxin are in commercial use and provide better pest control 
and insect-resistance management. New Bt proteins produced by protein engineering, along 
with anti-feedant proteins such as lectins, will extend the options for combining insecticidal 
proteins in GE crops (Lombardo et al. 2016). Another trend is expanding the range of crops 
protected by Bt toxins; for example Bt brinjal (eggplant or aubergine) is commercialised in 
Bangladesh, and commercial trials of Bt cowpea are in progress in Nigeria (Hallerman and 
Grabau 2016). 
RNA-interference (RNAi) is another mechanism for controlling pests. It uses gene sequence 
data to design double-stranded RNA (dsRNA) molecules that shutdown expression of a gene 
that is specific to a target pest, providing control of the pest with, in theory, no adverse 
effects on other species (Bachman et al. 2016). GE crops producing both dsRNA and Bt 
proteins for corn rootworm control are in development and near to commercialisation (Head 
et al. 2017). NBTs are expected to provide further mechanisms for insect control for 
introducing into crops; in particular they enable precise manipulation of plant secondary 
metabolism to enhance crops’ innate resistance to insects (Jirschitzka et al. 2013). 
GE virus-resistant squash and papaya have been in commercial use since the late 1990s, 
and control of viral disease continues to be a fruitful area for GE crop R&D (Lindbo and Falk 
2017). Commercial deployment of GE crops resistant to fungal or bacterial diseases has 
lagged behind that of GE virus resistance, often because of regulatory delays (Mullins 2015). 
However, GE potatoes resistant to late blight are nearing the market (Guenthner 2017), and 
several potential products are showing promise in field trials; these include oranges resistant 
to the bacterial disease citrus greening (Dutt et al. 2015) and bananas resistant to 
Xanthomonas wilt (Tripathi et al. 2014). 
GE herbicide-tolerant (HT) crops have been in commercial use for about 20 years and, like 
insect-tolerant crops, have provided economic and environmental benefits centred on fewer 
applications of herbicides and simplifying no-till cultivation (Brookes and Barfoot 2017a, 
2017b). R&D trends are also similar: newer GEHT crops are tolerant of more than one 
herbicide, which should slow the evolution herbicide-resistant weeds (Green 2017). Gene 
editing provides a powerful means to alter enzymes that are the targets of herbicides, 
thereby offering new methods to create herbicide-tolerant crops (Lombardo et al. 2016). 
RNAi may also be useful in weed management, although in this case dsRNA is likely to be 
sprayed on to plants, particularly herbicide-resistant weeds, in order to change their 
sensitivity to herbicides (Green 2014). 
In addition to plant breeding for pest control, research continues into crop protection products 
that act or can be applied more precisely. “Traditional” synthetic chemistry will continue to be 
vital for managing many pests and diseases. New pesticide modes of action are still being 
developed and commercialised (Jeschke 2016) and are crucial to slowing the evolution of 
resistance to pesticides. Molecules with new modes of action tend to be discovered by 
screening large libraries of synthesised compounds; however, natural products – metabolites 
produced in living cells – are also an importance source.  
Once an interesting molecule is discovered, hypothesis-led redesign is undertaken to 
improve properties such as its potency, stability, and uptake by and mobility within plants 
(Loso et al. 2017). Advances in reducing non-target toxicity, especially to people, while 
maintaining or increasing potency against the target pest, have been the key to successful 
development of many recent new products (Wing 2017). In general, the greater complexity of 
natural products makes their redesign more difficult and time-consuming than that for 
chemically synthesised molecules (Sparks et al. 2017). 
Biological pesticides are likely to increase in importance in crop protection owing to societal 
concerns about overuse of chemical pesticides and regulatory reaction – perhaps over-
reaction – to these concerns (Balog et al. 2017). As Glare (2015) points out, the main aim of 
defining a pesticide as biological is to indicate lower mammalian toxicity and reduced risk to 
non-target organisms compared with synthetic pesticides. However, it is wrong to assume 
that a biological origin is a guarantee of safety.  
Regulatory definitions of biological pesticides usually include viruses, bacteria and fungi that 
are used to suppress pest populations. Suppression may arise through toxicity or competitive 
inhibition. Semiochemicals, which modify pest behaviour, are also usually regarded as 
biological pesticides for regulatory purposes. In biological pesticides based on bacteria or 
fungi, the organisms may be used while living or dead. Formulations of B. thuringiensis that 
make use of its various insecticidal proteins to control important agricultural, forestry and 
public health pests use live bacteria. Products that use GE bacteria to produce dsRNA with 
activity against pests will use heat-killed bacteria (e.g., Zhu et al. 2011). The regulatory 
position of the latter products is uncertain and they may be considered as GE organisms 
rather than as biological pesticides. 
A final method worthy of consideration for innovation in crop protection is nanotechnology. 
Nanomaterials offer new formulations that can deliver crop protection chemicals more 
accurately and precisely to the target pest. Greater control over the timing of release of a 
chemical is a particular advantage of nanomaterials (Parisi et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2016).  
Nanoparticles themselves may be useful as pesticides. Nanoparticles of metal or metal 
oxides are toxic to a range of bacteria, fungi and plants and could form the basis of new 
bactericides, fungicides and herbicides (Baker et al. 2017).   
Products of regulated technologies will do more than increase or protect crop yield. They 
have enormous potential to increase the nutritional quality of food. In 2013, Bhutta et al. 
estimated that worldwide 3.1 million children under 5 years old die annually as the result of 
malnutrition; this represents about 45% of deaths in this age group. Genetic engineering of 
crops has great potential to help cut this terrible loss of life. A review by De Steur et al. in 
2015 summarised research into fortifying crops with micronutrients: target nutrients include 
vitamins A, B9, C and E, copper, iron and zinc; target crops include rice, maize, wheat, 
barley, sorghum, cassava, oilseeds, potatoes and various vegetables. Crops intended to 
reduce vitamin A deficiency are perhaps the most advanced, and include the well-known 
example of Golden Rice and also sorghum, banana and cassava. None of these crops is 
commercialised, owing in part to regulatory barriers; however, small-scale clinical trials of 
food from these crops and the beneficial effects of conventionally bred biofortified crops 
suggest that were these crops to receive regulatory approvals, they could be an effective 
source of micronutrients to help prevent malnutrition (De Steur et al. 2017). 
GE crops that improve human or livestock nutrition through altered fat content are already 
commercialised. Plenish® soybeans that contain zero trans fat and high amounts of 
monounsaturated fat have been available since 2014. Applications to sell other GE soybean 
and oilseed rape varieties with modified fatty acid profiles are undergoing regulatory reviews. 
Numerous other GE crops intended to have human-health benefits are in development, and 
include tomatoes enriched with anthocyanins, pineapples with high lycopene content and 
gluten-free wheat (Glass and Fanzo 2017). Development of GE crops for animal feed 
concentrates on increasing nutrients, such as lysine, or decreasing anti-nutrients, such as 
lignin and phytate (Tillie et al. 2013).   
Finally, regulated products also play a role in reducing food waste. Synthetic pesticides have 
long been used to prevent spoilage of stored agricultural products (Hagstrum and Phillips 
2017). One of the first GE crops to be commercialised was the Flavr SavrTM tomato, in which 
pectin solubilisation was decreased, leading to ripe fruit that had improved flavour and longer 
shelf-life (Kramer and Redenbaugh 1994). Recently, non-browning GE Arctic® apples and 
GE InnateTM potatoes have been commercialised. Both products reduce waste during 
processing and the apples enable fresh slices to be sold directly to the consumer (Glass and 
Fanzo 2013). 
The above discussion shows that regulated technology has the potential to deliver 
improvements in crop production and human and animal nutrition. A key to realising this 
potential is that regulatory barriers do not stifle the development and commercialisation of 
innovative products. To avoid such a result, advocates of the use of technology in agriculture 
will need to present a better case for its benefits than hitherto; in short, the use of technology 
must offer more than just greater efficiency of industrial agriculture. The rest of the article will 
examine the regulation of new technology and discuss how a case for widespread societal 
benefits of applying such technology to agriculture could be made.  
Regulation of new technologies in crop protection and seeds 
Tait (2007) categorised innovation in life sciences according to the effect that new 
technologies and their products have on the companies and industries that produce them. 
Incremental, or path-dependent, innovation improves existing products or services and is 
easily accommodated within existing business models and regulatory systems. Disruptive, or 
path-breaking, innovation, on the other hand, leads to major shifts in the types of product 
offered and may create completely new industries. Such innovation may require new types of 
regulation. 
In general, innovation in crop protection has been regarded as incremental, and this is likely 
to be true for many of the potential products described above. Incremental innovation does 
not require the passing of legislation to create new categories of regulation or radical 
overhaul of existing regulatory methods. This does not mean that regulations are simple or 
unchanging, rather the legal and scientific conceptual frameworks that support them are 
relatively stable. Hence, while achieving worldwide registrations of a crop-protection product 
is complicated because of different requirements among countries, and regulatory decision-
making is becoming more conservative in many countries (Handford et al. 2015), each new 
pesticide will be treated fairly similarly to its immediate predecessor in terms of data that 
must be supplied and the analysis of those data to assess risk. This is true even of synthetic 
pesticides that incorporate nanotechnology (Amenta et al. 2015).  
Genetic engineering of crops was regarded as a disruptive technology requiring new 
regulation in some countries. Mittra et al. (2011) point out that it was not inevitable that GE 
crops would be developed and marketed mainly by large agrochemical firms; the technology 
and products could have been developed by seed of food companies. If the products had 
been developed by seed companies, they may have been regarded as an incremental 
innovation in the seeds industry. However, their development by agrochemical companies 
led to their being regarded as disruptive innovation in the agrochemical industry and, as a 
consequence, regulations tended to be based on those governing pesticides rather than 
seeds.  
Had GE crops been regarded as an incremental innovation in the seeds industry, their 
regulation may have concentrated principally on matters related to plant breeders’ rights (see 
introduction). However, as they were perceived as a disruptive innovation in the 
agrochemical industry, the focus of regulation was risk to human and animal health and the 
environment. The United States adapted existing legislation and used existing agencies to 
regulate GE crops: the Food and Drug Administration evaluated risks to the food and feed 
supply; the Environmental Protection Agency evaluated GE crops that control pests (e.g., Bt 
crops); and the Department of Agriculture evaluated risks to agriculture by regarding GE 
crops as potential plant pests (McHugen and Smyth 2008). Most other jurisdictions created 
new agencies and regulations with the specific purpose of regulating GE crops (Evenson and 
Santaniello 2004). 
Developing new regulations rather than adapting old ones created problems that still dog the 
commercialisation of GE crops: long and uncertain regulatory decision-making and public 
scepticism about the safety and benefits of the technology and the motives of the industry 
that uses it (Johnson et al. 2007). The problems are more serious in some countries than 
others and to an extent have lessened as policy-makers and regulators become more 
familiar with GE crops. However, these problems still cause serious problems in the 
European Union (EU) and countries, such as many in Africa, with regulatory systems that are 
influenced by the EU (Paarlberg 2010). I briefly review these problems from the perspective 
of an applicant trying to guide a product through the system. 
The major problem with new regulations for GE crops may be summed up by the term “risk 
assessment – policy gap”, which was coined by Evans et al. (2006) to describe a situation 
where policy objectives are unclear and risk assessors have to interpret them before they 
can begin a regulatory risk assessment. GE crop regulations are often long on what data 
must be submitted to the relevant authorities, but are usually vague about what risks should 
be assessed and how the data will be used to make decisions. This means that applicants 
have to infer what decision-makers would regard as a harmful effect of growing or importing 
a GE crop, and use the data that they are required to collect in order to test hypotheses 
about the likelihood that use of their particular product causing such harm. 
Such a situation creates serious difficulties. First, the focus on data creates a pedantic, 
legalistic approach where the minutiae of study design and the completeness of a data 
package are more important than whether hypotheses that are relevant to decision-making 
have been tested sufficiently. Studies may have to be repeated because of scientifically 
trivial deviations from guidelines; studies may have to be larger or more complicated than is 
scientifically necessary in order to meet the different data requirements among countries; 
and studies may be conducted even though they test no relevant hypothesis, or test a 
relevant hypothesis with no greater rigour than do existing studies (Raybould 2006). Such 
work can be extremely wasteful of time, effort and money, especially where data 
requirements change continually without any obvious benefit for decision-making (Raybould 
and Poppy 2012). 
A second problem is that divorcing risk assessment from clear policy objectives creates the 
prefect opportunity for delaying decision-making and for creating policy ad hoc under the 
influence of vociferous opponents of GE crops. If risk assessment is seen solely as an 
exercise in reducing scientific uncertainty about the properties and likely behaviour of the GE 
crop, then it can be continued indefinitely. Empirical hypotheses can never be proved, hence 
uncertainty is always with us, and claiming a need to reduce scientific uncertainty can be 
used to justify endless further studies before a decision is possible. It follows that decisions 
can be delayed indefinitely or made suddenly for arbitrary reasons. This is the current 
situation in the EU (Davison and Ammann 2017).  
Where a regulatory system is failing to make timely decisions because of a risk assessment 
– policy gap, defining policy, not conducting more scientific studies, should be the priority for 
fixing the problem. Ironically, in calling for risk assessment to be “science-based”, advocates 
of genetic engineering for crop improvement actually play into their opponents hands by 
amplifying the importance of scientific uncertainty over policy uncertainty. The emphasis on 
scientific uncertainty enables opponents of the technology to create diversionary furores 
about “lack of scientific consensus” and thereby avoid having to address the economic and 
social consequences of their anti-GE crop policy (see Hilbeck et al. 2015, for example). 
Proponents of a technology can never win an argument based on scientific certainty about its 
safety because there can be no such thing. They can, however, win arguments about how 
using the technology may help to deliver certain policy objectives, and about the malign 
effects on regulatory systems of an unwillingness to discuss the policy objectives that the 
systems are supposed to deliver (Raybould 2012). I will return to these matters below when 
discussing how regulation of new agricultural technologies could be improved.  
The consequences of uncertainty about regulatory approvals for importation of GE crops 
include higher commodity prices and cost of food (Anderson 2010) and restrictions on the 
choice of seeds products for farmers in countries that export crops to countries where import 
approvals are delayed (Stein and Rodríguez-Cerezo 2010). Delayed decisions over 
approvals for cultivation of GE crops harm farmers who are unable to benefit from the 
reduced input costs associated with some GE crops (Park et al. 2011) or from price 
competition between chemicals and GE crops that solve similar agricultural products (Graff 
et al. 2009).  
Perhaps the most important consequence of unpredictable regulation is that its cost and 
complexity have severely limited the opportunities for institutions outside the large 
multinational companies to commercialise GE crops (Huesing et al. 2016). Solving the 
complex problems facing agriculture is likely to require innovations from small companies 
and the public sector to develop products that improve the production of minor and orphan 
crops (ASSAf 2017). It is important, therefore, that regulation of new technology enables a 
much wider range of organisations to develop products than has been the case with GE 
crops. In the next section, I discuss some principles for how this could be achieved.  
Improving the regulation of new agricultural technologies 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has set out eight 
“principles of good regulation” that are a valuable guide to thinking about whether or how 
new agricultural technologies and their products ought to be regulated (OECD, 2014). Table 
1 summarises each principle, along with a comment about its relevance to regulation of GE 
crops and any new regulations for new agricultural technology. I use the principles to 
structure a discussion of how current regulations could be improved. I focus on regulations 
covering GE crops to illustrate the potential pitfalls of regulation, but the remarks are 
intended to apply to regulatory systems generally. 
Table 1. OECD Principles of Regulation (OECD 2014) illustrated with learning from 
regulation of GE crops 
Principle of Regulation Learning from GE Crops 
1. Deliver clear policy goals 
Regulations should serve agricultural, 
environmental and economic policy 
objectives 
2. Have a sound legal and empirical basis 
Properties of a product may be a 
sounder basis for regulation than are its 
methods of manufacture  
3. Produce benefits that justify costs 
Concentrate on identifying potential 
harm and benefit not on administrative 
compliance and identifying differences 
4. Minimise costs and market distortions 
Make decisions based on risk and 
opportunity regardless of how the 
product was produced 
5. Promote innovation  
Provide incentives to develop beneficial 
products not only restrict use of 
potentially harmful products 
6. Be clear, simple and practical for users 
Reuse data where possible: data on 
similar products and data on same 
product from different country 
7. Be consistent with other regulations and 
policies 
A precautionary approach to 
agricultural technology may clash with 
economic policy   
8. Be compatible with competition and trade 
Minimise asynchrony between 
regulatory decisions in multiple 
countries 
 
As noted above, a major problem concerning regulation of GE crops has been the existence 
of a risk assessment – policy gap (violation of OECD Principle 1). Often the purpose of 
regulation is obscure; while there may be a stated intention to protect the environment and 
human and animal health, this is insufficiently precise for good regulation. One reason is that 
the exact nature of harmful effects that the regulations seek to control needs to be clear. In 
the case of human and animal health, harmful effects are usually unambiguous and 
uncontroversial, namely increased mortality and morbidity. On the other hand, agreeing what 
is to be regarded as environmental harm can be difficult, particularly at a landscape scale 
where individual preferences about aesthetics may play a large part in whether someone 
regards a particular effect as harmful (Sanvido et al, 2012, van Zanten et al. 2016). 
A second reason for policy obscurity relates to the acceptability of risk. Acceptable risk is a 
tricky term to define and requires numerous policy decisions (Table 2). Risk comprises two 
elements: the severity of a harmful effect that may result from an activity, and the likelihood 
that the effect will occur. In principle, the likelihood of an effect is a matter for science, 
whereas determining its severity is ultimately a question of policy.2 Even when people agree 
on what constitutes a harmful effect, they may disagree about how to judge its severity and 
how to weight severity and likelihood in determining the amount of risk. Determining whether 
a tiny probability of a serious effect is poses greater risk than a high probability of a minor 
effect requires potentially difficult judgement of contrary opinions rather than simply making a 
scientific calculation.  
Table 2. Terms that need to be determined in order to define acceptable risk 
Property of an activity How determined 
Harm caused Policy decision 
                                                          
2 The magnitude of an effect is in principle a matter solely for science. However, deciding severity involves 
judging the importance of an effect of a particular magnitude. Severity is separate from acceptability; 
agreement that an activity poses a certain severity of risk, does not imply agreement about whether the risk is 
acceptable.   
Severity of harm Policy decision 
Likelihood of harm Scientific calculation 
Amount of risk 
(= severity and likelihood of harm) 
Policy decision 
Benefit resulting Policy decision 
Value of benefit Policy decision 
Likelihood of benefit Scientific calculation 
Opportunity 
(= value and likelihood of benefit) 
Policy decision 
Method of weighting risk vs opportunity 
(Ethical vs utilitarian) 
Policy decision 
Acceptability of risk 
(Opportunity > risk if utilitarian) 
(Risk < threshold if ethical) 
Policy decision 
 
An additional difficulty in defining acceptable risk is how to make trade-offs with the 
opportunities of the activity in question. Opportunity is the opposite of risk, and comprises the 
value of the benefits that may ensue from an activity, and the likelihood of those benefits 
arising. Like risk, it comprises policy and scientific elements. Policy defines the beneficial 
effects of an activity and the value to be placed on benefits of a certain size, and science 
determines the likelihood of those effects arising as a result of the activity.   
In essence, there are two methods of handling trade-offs between risk and opportunity. 
Ethical decision-making sets a threshold for acceptable risk, and if the risk of a proposed 
activity exceeds this threshold, the activity will not be permitted regardless of the opportunity. 
If there are many options for decision-makers, they can choose among those that are below 
the risk threshold, perhaps on the basis of which provides the most opportunity. Utilitarian 
decision-making, on the other hand, considers the net opportunity (the opportunity minus the 
risk) for each option and chooses the option with the highest ne opportunity. This option 
could be most risky but also provides the largest opportunity (Sanvido et al. 2012). 
A key point from the above discussion is that when considering introduction of regulation of 
new technology, it is crucial that, as far as possible, the policy objectives are considered first. 
The regulations can then be designed to deliver those objectives. Too often regulatory 
decision-making over GE crops seems to become bogged down because in the absence of 
clear policy objectives, the regulatory system has to try to create them.  
Regulatory systems seeking to create policy may be the source of regular complaints that 
decision-making over GE crops is politicised (e.g., Smyth and Phillips 2014). For reasons 
described above, it is essential that politics be involved in crafting regulation: the 
opportunities to be sought, the risks to be controlled and how opportunity and risk are 
balanced are matters of public policy. However, these policy decisions should be taken ex 
ante in order to design good regulation; regulation should not be used to work out policy.   
Just as regulation of new technology should not be used to resolve policy, it should also not 
be a vehicle for scientific research. Regulation should be based on sufficient scientific 
knowledge of the relevant technology, not be the means of producing that knowledge (Hill 
and Sendashonga 2003). 
At the beginning of the translation of scientific discoveries into new technology there may be 
high uncertainty about the kinds and properties of products that may be produced by the 
technology (Tait et al. 2017). In order to inform policy that may lead to regulation of such 
products, it is likely that scientific research will be necessary to characterise what products 
the technology could produce, and to predict the behaviour of those products. Of particular 
interest will be the potential for unintended and unwanted side-effects of potential products. 
While this being is determined, it may be necessary to regulate research in order to minimise 
risk to scientists undertaking it, and risks to the wider public. Once sufficient knowledge has 
been gained to inform policymaking, thoughts can turn to regulation of products of the 
technology, along with any revision of regulation of the basic research (Raybould et al. 
2012).  
The first conclusion to be drawn from scientific research is whether products of the 
technology should be regulated, and, if they should, whether existing regulations are 
suitable. There is much discussion currently about the regulatory status of gene-edited crops, 
which centres on their similarity to conventional or GE crops. Many scientists argue that 
gene-edited crops should not require regulation if they are indistinguishable from products of 
conventional breeding, and any regulation should cover only products that are significantly 
different from those produced by conventional breeding. Regulation should not cover gene 
editing itself (Caroll et al. 2016, Huang et al. 2016). These recommendations are in line with 
OECD Principles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, and could be implemented in a similar fashion to Canadian 
regulation of GE crops. Others argue that gene-edited crops should be regulated as GE 
crops because similar processes are used in their creation (reviewed by Wolt et al. 2016). 
Again, this view could be consistent with OECD Principles 2 and 7, perhaps depending on 
whether the “legal” or “empirical” basis for regulation (OECD Principle 2) is regarded as 
stronger. It is difficult to envisage process-based regulation of GE crops fulfilling OECD 
Principles 4 and 5. 
If products of a technology are to be regulated, it is important to differentiate between studies 
that are useful for formulating regulatory policy about a technology and those to be required 
for regulatory decisions about individual products of that technology. Many studies required 
for regulatory risk assessments of GE crops are more like basic research into whether 
genetic engineering produces unintended effects, rather than studies that focus on 
unintended side-effects of the new trait introduced by the genetic engineering.  
When seeking approval for import or cultivation of a particular GE crop, applicants have to 
submit a compositional analysis study: a detailed comparison of the proximates (protein, fat, 
carbohydrate etc.), minerals, vitamins, fatty acids and anti-nutrients of the GE crop and a 
genetically similar conventional variety. A similar phenotypic characterisation study is also 
required; this compares the gross phenotypes of the GE crop and a genetically similar non-
GE comparator (see Raybould et al. [2010] for variables that are typically measured in these 
studies). The origin of these studies is probably a concern that genetic engineering would 
have unpredictable effects on crop phenotypes. This concern is understandable, but leads to 
serious problems. Compositional analysis and phenotypic characterisation studies are 
expensive to produce and time-consuming to review, but contribute little to risk assessment, 
thereby violating OECD Principle 3. In addition, regulatory authorities often require studies to 
be performed on material grown in their country or to their own particular design, or both, 
thereby violating OECD Principle 6.  
The reason that these studies contribute little to risk assessment is that potentially harmful 
differences are rarely, if ever, defined (e.g., a 50% reduction in nutrient X or a 50% increase 
in anti-nutrient Y). Hence, the studies are simply tests of the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the GE crop and the comparator, rather than a test of the hypothesis that use of the 
GE crop will not be harmful. Extensive cataloguing of differences may feel like a thorough 
assessment of risk, but it may have the unintended effect of increasing risk because a 
potentially harmful difference may be missed among a mass of data of unknown relevance. 
This criticism would apply equally to omics techniques that profile genetic or metabolic 
differences and which are suggested as means to “improve” risk assessment for regulated 
products in agriculture (Li et al. 2017). 
Phenotypic and compositional analyses of GE crops teach us valuable lessons for the 
regulation of products of new agricultural technologies. First, studies that may provide 
evidence to test hypotheses about techniques should be avoided in risk assessments for 
products. Testing hypotheses about the relative variability of products created by different 
methods may provide useful knowledge to set regulatory policy; however, for risk 
assessment, we need to specify precisely what changes we regard as indicating potential 
harm. Second, data requirements need to be reviewed regularly. The many compositional 
and phenotypic analyses conducted for product registrations may be viewed collectively as 
robust corroboration of the hypothesis that genetic engineering per se does not introduce 
harmful unintended changes into crops more frequently than does conventional breeding 
(although genetic engineering could introduce traits that have unwanted consequences, as 
could conventional breeding). Hence, there is a strong argument for no longer requiring such 
studies for GE crops in which the introduced trait is not intended to change metabolism 
(Herman and Price 2013). Even for crops with altered metabolism, a hypothesis-driven 
approach that searches for specified potentially harmful changes would be more useful than 
profiling. 
As with reducing policy uncertainty, spending time reducing scientific uncertainty before 
introducing product regulation is likely to speed up commercialisation of products. Just as 
many of the delays in GE crop decision-making result from the regulatory system trying to 
sort out policy, much of the expense and time in producing regulatory dossiers comes from 
conducting studies that assess the technology not the product. While developers may want 
rapid introduction of regulation of products of new technology, carrying policy and scientific 
uncertainties about the technology into product regulations could be disastrous. A pause to 
clarify policy and conduct research in order to produce effective regulations may save much 
time in the long run. 
Two final points about GE crops and regulation of future new technologies. Regulation of GE 
crops seems generally lacking in encouragement for innovation (violating OECD Principle 5), 
even in jurisdictions where the stated economic policy is growth based on exploiting new 
biological knowledge (violating OECD Principle 7) (Masip et al. 2013). Indeed, Miller and 
Conko (2004) argue that some companies colluded in making GE regulations restrict 
innovation in order to discourage new competitors and protect themselves from the 
dynamism of the market. 
Chataway et al. (2006) describe various approaches to regulation: enabling verses 
constraining, and discriminate verses indiscriminate. These opposing approaches combine to 
give four types of regulation (Figure 1).  The ideal combination for encouraging innovative 
use of a new technology is probably enabling and discriminating, whereby policy encourages 
use of the technology to develop products with desirable properties. Too often regulation of 
GE crops appears constraining and indiscriminate and institutions are simply discouraged 
from developing any kind of GE crop. 
Defining what is desirable may be controversial. It will involve difficult policy decisions (Table 
2) as no class product is universally desirable; even potentially life-saving drugs with few 
side-effects may not be used because their cost diverts money away from interventions that 
could save more lives (Eichler et al. 2015). However, shirking such decisions will lead to 
regulation that discourages innovation, or at least innovation that is beneficial to society. I 
return to this subject in the next section. 
Figure 1.  Approaches to the regulation of products of a new technology. The 
definitions of the types of regulatory system (in bold) are from Chataway et al. 2006) 
 
The only OECD Principle not mentioned so far is 8 – compatibility with trade and competition. 
Asynchrony of cultivation and import approvals has caused severe problems for the 
commercialisation of GE crops (de Faria and Wieck 2015). One contributor to asynchronous 
approvals is lack of internationally accepted standards for certain regulatory studies, 
particularly field trials (Garcia-Alonso et al. 2014). Greater mutual acceptance of data 
produced in different countries would not only help to reduce the costs and complexity of 
regulation (fulfilling OECD Principles 3 and 6), but would also help to coordinate regulatory 
decision-making among countries. Greater use of existing data produced elsewhere does not 
mean that countries are forced to make similar regulatory decisions. Given that policy 
objectives are the driver for decision-making (Table 2), it is entirely feasible for countries to 
make different decisions based on the same data. 
In summary, regulation of products of new agricultural technologies can improve greatly on 
current regulation of GE crops. Good regulations follow from clarity about policy objectives 
and sufficient scientific knowledge about the technology. Product regulation must not be 
used to make policy or carry out scientific research. A delay in introducing product regulation 
in order to clarify policy and conduct essential research should be regarded as a good 
investment of time. Perhaps the most important lesson is that politics3 is essential for good 
regulation. Removing politics from the formulation of regulations will almost guarantee a 
system that fails to make timely decisions because the decision-making will have to create 
policy rather than execute it. 
                                                          
3 Meaning politics as the methods for setting public policy; not party politics. 
Societal acceptance versus regulatory approval  
Regulatory approvals for products of a particular technology do not ensure that the 
technology is welcomed by society. Product regulation cannot cover every aspect of how a 
product is used. In particular, it hard to predict how the introduction of new products will alter 
economic and social behaviour at large scales. While regulation of crop protection and seeds 
products can minimise risk to human and animal health, and to the local environment where 
they are used, it cannot control how the products contribute to the development of farming 
systems. Hence, although people may accept that use of certain products of an agricultural 
technology are “safe” in terms of meeting regulatory requirements in toxicology and 
environmental fate, they may be reluctant to accept the use of the technology in general 
owing to dislike of industrial agriculture that it is perceived to encourage. Hence, stressing 
that its products meet regulatory standards is often an inadequate response to opposition to 
a technology, and may lead to more restrictions as regulation tries to catch up with public 
opinion (Malyska et al. 2016).   
There are many critiques of industrial agriculture that centre on technical analysis of its 
economic inefficiency or its ecological unsustainability. However, another common theme is 
yearning for farming as it used to be, or at least as it was imagined to be: the loss of faming 
as creator of beautiful landscapes; and the loss of farming as local businesses, rooted in 
rural life, that provided food of known provenance. This loss was captured by Manning 
(2004) in an essay in which he called industrial agriculture a “malign force”: 
“… food experts now speak not of food but of commodities. And 
with reason. The produce of farm fields is no longer a diverse 
flow of foods to tables so much as inputs to a series of 
factories. Livestock have left the farm and are now produced in 
what are called “confinement operations, beastly concentration 
camps where chickens, hogs, cattle and turkeys are packed 
and fed a stream of grain.”  
While product developers can stress, with good reason, the lower mammalian toxicity and 
environmental persistence of crop-protection products that new technology helps to provide, 
there is a widespread perception that products of new technology perpetuate or even worsen 
the trends the Manning decries. For example, concerns about GE crops further encouraging 
the industrialisation of agriculture have been around since at least the mid-1990s (Crouch 
1995), and Manning himself writes of “gene jockeys” being part of a lobby that benefits from 
industrialisation of agriculture. 
Developers and users of new agricultural technology often portray the views expounded by 
Manning and others as romantic, and point out the necessity of improving agricultural 
production in developing countries (e.g., Blancke et al. 2015). Hence, defence of new 
technology often becomes a caricature of rational use of science to prevent mass starvation 
and malnutrition fighting to overcome the irrational prejudices of well-fed, hopeless romantics 
in developed countries. Judging by continuing controversy about GE crops, such arguments 
are counterproductive.  
Discussing the best ways to encourage conservation of biodiversity, Knowlton (2017) wrote,  
“… unrelenting doom and gloom in the absence of solutions is 
not effective … Social scientists have known for decades that 
large problems without solutions lead to apathy, not action. Yet 
much of conservation communication still seems to be focused 
on scaring people into caring. As a [conservation] community, 
we seem to be addicted to despair.”  
She went on explain that, while not being a Pollyanna, she has found that optimistic 
messages inspire and energise people to find solutions to problems. 
Advocates of new technology in agriculture could learn much from Knowlton’s short essay. 
Often communication about new technology in agriculture is doom and gloom and scaring 
people into caring: in essence, “allow us to use this technology or tens of millions of people 
will starve.” Even if this were true, hopes for farming systems that are less like factories are 
not irrational or inevitably wrong, and presenting them as so does worse than create apathy; 
it creates mistrust and hostility. 
Currently, feeding 9 billion people may be incompatible with small-scale agriculture selling to 
local markets. However, advocating the need for industrial agriculture should not necessarily 
mean defending its every effect; one can accept that something is necessary while hoping 
and planning for something better. As discussed earlier, the “right decision” is often 
impossible (Miller 2003) and claiming that industrial agriculture has no flaws is unrealistic, 
inaccurate and seems defensive. Creating optimism for better farming – retaining the good 
aspects of industrial agriculture while acknowledging is unpopular features and trying to 
eliminate them – seems much more likely to lead to acceptance of new technology than does 
peddling relentless doom and gloom about the future should the technology remain unused. 
Knowlton recognised that conservation “is often two steps forward, one step back — or 
frustratingly, one step forward, two steps back”. Using products of new technology in 
agriculture will be similar. Improvements in the productivity or nutritional quality of crops may 
sometimes be associated with greater industrialisation, even when this was not the intention. 
However, it is important that advocates of new technology do not imply that concern about 
the side-effects of greater productivity is irrational. Even if one thinks that, on balance, the 
productivity – industrialisation trade-off is worthwhile, listening to those with a different 
opinion, and showing that you have understood it, ought to create a more optimistic 
atmosphere for discussing the role of new technology in agriculture. 
A final point is that the onus for creating a more optimistic discussion about innovation in 
agriculture should not rest solely on developers of technology and its products. Recently, Tait 
et al. (2017) have proposed that public debate about new technology should conform to a 
Responsible Engagement standard. Among the guidelines for developing a standard they 
suggest ensuring “equitable treatment across all stakeholders” and not allowing “the values 
and interests of one stakeholder group to restrict the freedom of choice of others.” Of crucial 
importance is that the standard would require all interested parties to engage responsibly, 
not just industry.  
Conclusion 
Using new technology in agriculture has great potential to improve human well-being by 
leading to the development of products that improve the quantity, quality and reliability of 
food production. Moreover, there are good grounds for optimism that demands for improved 
production can be delivered by agricultural systems that also meet increasing ethical and 
aesthetic standards. The successes of industrial agriculture originate from economies of 
scale. If miniaturisation of equipment, precision agriculture and gene editing can combine to 
reduce the scale at which economies are realised, farming systems may become more 
diverse and less industrial. 
Crucial to realising this ambition are regulations that encourage innovation, and give small 
companies and public sector institutions the opportunity to commercialise their products. In 
order to achieve this, product regulations must be designed to achieve clear policy objectives 
and be based on sufficient scientific knowledge. As experience with GE crops shows, 
product regulation should not be the place to conduct policy debates, nor should assembling 
data to meet regulatory requirements be redirected to basic research into a new technology. 
Failure to define clear policy objectives will lead to protracted and capricious decision-
making, and using regulations to conduct research will mean requests to submit vast 
amounts of regulatory data that fail to assist decision-makers. Unpredictable, costly 
regulation is the enemy of innovation.  
Finally, good regulation will be necessary but insufficient to realise the potential of new 
technology. Social acceptance of products of new technology is also crucial. Key to 
achieving this is creating more optimistic messages that new agricultural technologies are 
about more than averting mass starvation. New technology can help to provide sufficient 
food and promote the social, ethical and aesthetic aspects of farming that people value, but 
that often disappear as agriculture becomes more industrialised.   
 
References 
Amenta V, Aschberger K, Arena M, Bouwmeester H, Moniz FB, Brandhoff P, Gottardo S, 
Marvin HJP, Mech A, Pesudo LQ, Rauscher H, Schoonjans R, Vettori MV, Weigel S, Peters 
RJ (2015) Regulatory aspects of nanotechnology in the agri/feed/food sector in EU and non-
EU countries. Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 73, 463–476. 
Anderson K (2010) Economic impacts of policies affecting crop biotechnology and trade. 
Nature Biotechnology 27, 558–564. 
ASSAf (Academy of Science of South Africa) The Regulatory Implications of New Breeding 
Techniques. ASSAf, Pretoria. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/assaf.2016/0011> 
Bachman PM, Huizinga KM, Jensen PD, Mueller G, Tan J, Uffman JP, Levine SP (2016) 
Ecological risk assessment for DvSnf7 RNA: A plant-incorporated protectant with targeted 
activity against western corn rootworm. Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 81, 77–88. 
Baker S, Volova T, Prudnikova SV, Satish S, Prasad, N.(2017) Nanoagroparticles emerging 
trends and future prospect in modern agriculture system. Environmental Toxicology and 
Pharmacology 53, 10–17.  
Balog A, Hartel T, Loxdale H, Wilson K (2017) Differences in the progress of the biopesticide 
revolution between the EU and other major crop growing regions. Pest Management Science 
73 
Bardgett R and Gibson DJ (2017) Plant ecological solutions to global food security. Journal 
of Ecology 105, 859–864. 
Bhutta LZ, Das JK, Rizvi A, Gaffey MF, Walker N, Horton S, Webb P, Lartey A, Black RE 
(2013) Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what 
can be done and at what cost? Lancet 382, 452–477. 
Blancke S, Van Breusegem F, De Jaeger G, Braeckman J, Van Montagu M (2015) Fatal 
attraction: the intuitive appeal of GMO opposition. Trends in Plant Science 20, 414–418. 
Brahmi P, Chaudhary V (2011) Protection of plant varieties: systems across countries. Plant 
Genetic Resources 9, 392–403. 
Brookes P, Barfoot P (2017a) Environmental impacts of genetically modified (GM) crop use 
1996–2015: impacts on pesticide use and carbon emissions. GM Crops & Food 8, 117–147. 
Brookes G, Barfoot P (2017b) Farm income and production impacts of using GM crop 
technology 1996–2015. GM Crops & Food 8, 156–193. 
Cabello JV, Lodeyro AF, Zurbriggen MD (2014) Novel perspectives for the engineering of 
abiotic stress tolerance in plants. Current Opinion in Biotechnology 26, 62–70. 
Caroll D, Van Eenennaam AL, Taylor JF, Seger J, Voytas DF (2016) Regulate genome-
edited products, not genome editing itself. Nature Biotechnology 34, 477–479. 
Chandler D, Davidson G, Grant WP, Greaves J, Tatchell GM (2008) Microbial biopesticides 
for integrated crop management: an assessment of environmental and regulatory 
sustainability. Trends in Food Science & Technology 19, 275–283. 
Chataway J, Tait J, Wield D (2006) The governance of agro- and pharmaceutical 
biotechnology innovation: public policy and industrial strategy. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management 18, 169–185. 
Cooper J, Dobson H (2007) The benefits of pesticides to mankind and the environment. Crop 
Protection 26, 1337–1348. 
Crouch ML (1995) Biotechnology is not compatible with sustainable agriculture. Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 8, 98–111. 
De Steur H, Blancquaert D, Strobbe S, Lambert W, Gellnynck X, Van Der Straeten D (2015) 
Status and market potential of transgenic biofortified crops. Nature Biotechnology 33, 25–29. 
De Steur H, Mehta S, Gellynck X, Finkelstein JL (2017) GM biofortified crops: potential 
effects on targeting the micronutrient intake gap in human populations. Current Opinion in 
Biotechnology 44, 181–188. 
Davison J, Ammann K (2017) New GMO regulations for old: determining a new future for EU 
crop biotechnology. GM Crops & Food 8, 13–34. 
De Faria RN, Wieck C (2015) Empirical evidence on the trade impact of asynchronous 
regulatory approval of new GMO events. Food Policy 53, 22–32. 
Devos Y, Demont M, Dillen K, Reheul D, Kaiser M, Sanvido O (2009) Coexistence of 
genetically modified (GM) and non-GM crops in the European Union. A review. Agronomy for 
Sustainable Development 29, 11–30. 
Dutt M, Barthe G, Irey M, Grosser J (2015) Transgenic citrus expressing an Arabidopsis 
NPR1 gene exhibit enhanced resistance against Huanglongbing (HLB; Citrus Greening). 
PLoS ONE 10, e0137134. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137134> 
eCFR (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations) (2017) Title 40, Chapter I, Subchapter E, 
Par152 § 152.3 Pesticide registration and classification procedures – definitions. US 
Government Publishing Office. <https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-
bin/textidx?SID=7fc932da21ccd460ad5bae4f4d426ed2&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title40/40cfr152_m
ain_02.tpl> 
Eichler H-G, Baird LG, Bloechl-Daum B, Børlum-Kristensen F, Brown J, Chua R, Del Signore 
S, Dugan U, Ferguson J, Garner S, Goettsch W, Haigh J, Honig P, Hoos A, Huckle P, Kondo 
T, Le Cam Y, Leufkens H, Lim R, Longson C, Lumpkin M, Maraganore J, O’Rourke B, Oye 
K, Pezalla E, Pignatti F, Raine J, Rasi G, Salmonson T, Samaha D, Schneeweiss S, Siviero 
PD, Skinner M, Teagarden JR, Tominaga T, Trusheim MR, Tunis S, Unger TF, Vamvakas S, 
Hirsch G (2015) From adaptive licensing to adaptive pathways: delivering a flexible life-span 
approach to bring new drugs to patients. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 97, 234–246. 
European Commission (2017) Pesticides. European Commission, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides_en>. 
Evans J, Wood G, Miller A (2006) The risk assessment–policy gap: an example from the UK 
contaminated land regime. Environment International 32, 1066–1071. 
Evenson RE, Gollin D 2003. Assessing the impact of the Green Revolution, 1960 to 2000. 
Science 300, 758–762. 
Evenson RE, Santaniello V (Eds) (2004) The Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology CABI 
Publishing, Wallingford. 
Galloway JN (1998) The global nitrogen cycle: changes and consequences. Environmental 
Pollution 102, Supplement 1, 15–24. 
Garcia-Alonso M, Hendley P, Bigler F, Mayeregger E, Parker R, Rubinstein C, Satorre E, 
Solari F, McLean MA (2014) Transportability of confined field trial data for environmental risk 
assessment of genetically engineered plants: a conceptual framework. Transgenic Research 
23, 1025–1041. 
Glare TR (2015) Types of biopesticides. In Biopesticides Handbook (Eds LML Nollet, HS 
Rathore) pp. 7–24. CRC Press, Boca Raton. 
Glass S, Fanzo J (2017) Genetic modification technology for nutrition and improving diets: an 
ethical perspective. Current Opinion in Biotechnology 44, 46–51. 
Godfray HCJ, Beddington JR, Crute IR, Haddad L, Lawrence D, Muir JF, Pretty J, Robinson 
S, Thomas SM, Toulmin C (2010). Food security: the challenge of feeding 9 billion people. 
Science 327, 812–818. 
Graff GD, Hochman G, Zilberman D (2009) The political economy of agricultural 
biotechnology policies. AgBioForum 12, 34–46. 
Green JM (2014) Current state of herbicides in herbicide-resistant crops. Pest Management 
Science 70, 1351–1357. 
Green JM (2017) The rise and future of glyphosate and glyphosate-resistant crops. Pest 
Management Science DOI: 10.1002/ps.4462 
Gruber H, Paul V, Meyer HHD, Müller M (2012) Determination of insecticidal Cry1Ab protein 
in soil collected in the final growing seasons of a nine-year field trial of Bt-maize MON810. 
Transgenic Research 21, 77–88. 
Guenthner JF (2017) Economic and environmental benefits of biotech potatoes with traits for 
bruise resistance, late blight resistance, and cold storage. AgBioForum 20, 37–45. 
Hagstrum DW, Phillips TW (2017) Evolution of stored-product entomology: protecting the 
world food supply. Annual Review of Entomology 62, 379–397. 
Hallerman E, Grabau E (2016) Crop biotechnology: a pivotal moment for global acceptance. 
Food and Energy Security 5, 3–17. 
Handford CE, Elliott CT, Campbell K (2015) A review of the global pesticide legislation and 
the scale of challenge in reaching the global harmonization of food safety standards. 
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 11, 525–536. 
Head GP, Carroll MW, Evans SP, Rule DM, Willse AR, Clark TL, Storer NP, Flannagan RD, 
Samuel LW, Meinke LJ (2017) Evaluation of SmartStax and SmartStax PRO maize against 
western corn rootworm and northern corn rootworm: efficacy and resistance management. 
Pest Management Science 73, 1883–1899. 
Herman RA, Price WD (2013) Unintended compositional changes in genetically modified 
(GM) crops: 20 years of research. Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry 61, 11695–
11701.  
Hérouet C, Esdaile DJ, Mallyon BA, Debruyne E, Schulz A, Currier T, Hendrickx K, van der 
Klis R-J, Rouan D (2005) Safety evaluation of the phosphinothricin acetyltransferase proteins 
encoded by the pat and bar sequences that confer tolerance to glufosinate-ammonium 
herbicide in transgenic plants. Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 41, 134–139. 
Hilbeck A, Binimelis R, Defarge N, Steinbrecher R, Székács A, Wickson F, Antoniou M, 
Bereano PL, Clark EA, Hansen M, Novotny E, Heinemann J, Meyer H, Shiva V, Wynne B 
(2015) No scientific consensus on GMO safety. Environmental Sciences Europe 27, 4. DOI 
10.1186/s12302-014-0034-1. 
Hill RA, Sendashonga C (2003) General principles for risk assessment of living modified 
organisms: lessons from chemical risk assessment. Environmental Biosafety Research 2, 81 
– 88. 
Horrigan L, Lawrence RS, Walker P (2002) How sustainable agriculture can address the 
environmental and human health harms of industrial agriculture. Environmental Health 
Perspectives 110, 445–456. 
Huang S, Weigel D, Beachy RN, Li J (2016) A proposed regulatory framework for genome-
edited crops. Nature Genetics 48, 109–111. 
Huesing JE, Andres D, Braverman MP, Burns A, Felsot AS, Harrigan GG, Hellmich RL, 
Reynolds A, Shelton AM, van Rijssen WJ, Morris EJ, Eloff JN (2016) Global adoption of 
genetically modified (GM) crops: challenges for the public sector. Journal of Agricultural and 
Food Chemistry 64, 394–402. 
Jeschke P (2016) Progress of modern agricultural chemistry and future prospects. Pest 
Management Science 72, 433–455. 
Jirschitzka J, Mattern DJ, Gershenzon J, D’Auria JC (2013) Learning from nature: new 
approaches to the metabolic engineering of plant defense pathways. Current Opinion in 
Biotechnology 24, 320–328.  
Johnson KL, Raybould AF, Hudson MD, Poppy GM (2007) How does scientific risk 
assessment of GM crops fit within the wider risk analysis? Trends in Plant Science 12, 1-5. 
King A (2017) Technology: the future of agriculture. Nature 544, S21–S23. 
Knowlton N (2017) Doom and gloom won’t save the world. Nature 544, 271. 
Kramer MG, Redenbaugh K (1994) Commercialization of a tomato with an antisense 
polygalacturonase gene: the FLAVR SAVRTM tomato story. Euphytica 79, 293–297. 
Li R, Quan S, Yan X, Biswas S, Zhang D, Shi J (2017) Molecular characterization of 
genetically-modified crops: challenges and strategies. Biotechnology Advances 35, 302–309. 
Lindbo JA, Falk BW (2017) The impact of “coat-protein mediated virus resistance in applied 
plant pathology and basic research. Phytopathology 107, 624–634. 
Lombardo L, Coppola G, Zelasco S (2016) New technologies for insect-resistant and 
herbicide-tolerant plants. Trends in Biotechnology 34, 49–57. 
Long SP, Marshall-Colon A, Zhu X-G (2015) Meeting the global food demand of the future by 
engineering crop photosynthesis and yield potential. Cell 161, 56–66. 
Loso MR, Garizi N, Hedge VB, Hunter JE, Sparks TC (2017) Lead generation in crop 
protection research: a portfolio approach to agrochemical discovery. Pest Management 
Science 73, 678–685. 
McAllister CH, Beatty PH, Good AG (2012) Engineering nitrogen use efficient crop plants: 
the current status. Plant Biotechnology Journal 10, 1011–1025. 
Macdonald P (2014) Genetically modified organisms regulatory challenges and science: a 
Canadian perspective. Journal für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit 9, 
Supplement 1, 59–64.  
McHughen A (2012) Introduction to the GM crops special issue on biosafety, food and GM 
regulation. GM Crops & Food 3, 6–8. 
McHughen A, Smyth S (2008) US regulatory system for genetically modified [genetically 
modified organism (GMO), rDNA or transgenic] crop cultivars. Plant Biotechnology Journal 6, 
2–12. 
Maienfisch P, Stevenson TM (2015) Modern agribusiness – markets, companies, benefits 
and challenges. In Discovery and Synthesis of Crop Protection Products (Eds P Maienfisch, 
TM Stevenson) pp. 1–13. American Chemical Society, Washington, DC. 
Malyska A, Bolla R, Twardowski T (2016) The role of public opinion in shaping trajectories of 
agricultural biotechnology. Trends in Biotechnology 34, 530–534. 
Manning R (2004) Against the grain: a portrait of industrial agriculture as a malign force. The 
American Scholar 73, 13–35. 
Marx L (1983) Are science and society going in the same direction? Science, Technology & 
Human Values 8, 6–9. 
Masip G, Sabalza M, Pérez-Massot E, Banakar R, Cebrian D, Twyman RM, Capell T, 
Albajes R, Christou P (2013) Paradoxical EU agricultural policies on genetically engineered 
crops. Trends in Plant Science 18, 312–324. 
Meister R, Rajani MS, Ruzicka D, Schachtman DP (2014) Challenges of modifying root traits 
in crops for agriculture. Trends in Plant Science 19, 779–788. 
Miller D (2003) Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence. Open Court, Chicago and 
La Salle, Illinois. 
Miller HI, Conko G (2004) The Frankenfood Myth. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut. 
Mittra J, Tait J, Wield D (2011) From maturity to value-added innovation: lessons from the 
pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology industries. Trends in Biotechnology 29, 105–109.  
Mittra J, Mastroeni M, Tait J (2014) Engaging with uncertainty and risk in agricultural 
biotechnology regulation: delivering safety and innovation. Innogen Institute Report 
<http://innogen.org.uk/downloads/Final-Report_140429.pdf> 
Müller K, Tiktak A, Dijkman TJ, Green S, Clothier B (2014) Advances in pesticide risk 
reduction.  In Encyclopedia of Agriculture and Food Systems Volume 1 (Ed. NK van Alfen) 
pp. 17–34. Academic Press, London, Waltham and San Diego. 
Mullins E (2015) Engineering for disease resistance: persistent obstacles clouding tangible 
opportunities. Pest Management Science 71, 645–651. 
Nicholls CI, Altieri MA (1997) Conventional agricultural development models and the 
persistence of the pesticide treadmill in Latin America. International Journal of Sustainable 
Development and World Ecology 4, 93–111.  
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) (2014) The Governance 
of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209015-en>  
Oerke E-C, Dehne H-W (2004) Safeguarding production – major losses in crops and the role 
of crop protection. Crop Protection 23, 275–285. 
Paarlberg R (2010) GMO foods and crops: Africa’s choice. New Biotechnology 27, 609–613. 
Parisi C, Vigani M, Rodríguez-Cerezo E (2015) Agricultural nanotechnologies: what are the 
current possibilities? Nano Today 10, 124–127. 
Park J, McFarlane I, Phipps R, Ceddia G (2011) The impact of the EU regulatory constraint 
of transgenic crops on farm income. Nature Biotechnology 28, 396–406. 
Pavone V, Goven J, Guarino R (2011) From risk assessment to in-context trajectory 
evaluation – GMOs and their social implications. Environmental Sciences Europe 23, 1–13.  
Phillips McDougall (2011) The cost and time involved in the discovery, development and 
authorisation of a new plant biotechnology derived trait. Phillips McDougal Report 
https://croplife.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf_files/Getting-a-Biotech-Crop-to-Market-Phillips-
McDougall-Study.pdf 
Raybould A (2006) Problem formulation and hypothesis testing for environmental risk 
assessments of genetically modified crops. Environmental Biosafety Research 5, 119-125. 
Raybould A (2012) Can science justify regulatory decisions about the cultivation of 
transgenic crops? Transgenic Research 21, 691-698. 
Raybould A, Kurtz R, Zeph L (2012) Regulatory science, research science, and innovation in 
agricultural biotechnology. In Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: The United States 
and Canada (Eds CA Wozniak, A McHughen pp. 317-333. Springer Science + Business 
Media, Dordrecht.  
Raybould A, Poppy GM (2012) Commercialising GM crops under EU regulations: objectives 
and barriers. GM Crops & Food 3, 9–20. 
Raybould A, Tuttle A, Shore S, Stone T (2010) Environmental risk assessments for 
transgenic crops producing output trait enzymes. Transgenic Research 19, 595–609. 
Romeis J, Meissle M, Bigler F (2006) Transgenic crops expressing Bacillus thuringiensis 
toxins and biological control. Nature Biotechnology 24, 63–71.  
Sanvido O, Romeis J, Gathmann A, Gielkens M, Raybould A,  Bigler F. (2012). Evaluating 
environmental risks of genetically modified crops – ecological harm criteria for regulatory 
decision-making. Environmental Science and Policy 9, 82-91. 
Savvides A, Ali S, Tester M, Fotopoulos V (2016) Chemical priming of plants against multiple 
abiotic stresses: mission impossible? Trends in Plant Science 21, 329–340. 
Scott D (2011) The technological fix criticisms and the agricultural biotechnology debate. 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24, 207–226. 
Shaner DL, Beckie HJ (2014) The future for weed control and technology. Pest Management 
Science 70, 1329–1339. 
Smyth SJ (2017) Genetically modified crops, regulatory delays and international trade. Food 
and Energy Security 6, 78–86. 
Smyth SJ, Phillips PWB (2014) Risk, regulation and biotechnology: the case of GM crops. 
GM Crops & Food 5, 170–177. 
Sparks TC, Hahn DR, Garizi NV (2017) Natural products, their derivatives, mimics and 
synthetic equivalents: role in agrochemical discovery. Pest Management Science 73, 700–
715. 
Sparks TC, Lorsbach BA (2017) Perspectives on the agrochemical industry and 
agrochemical discovery. Pest Management Science 73, 672–677. 
Stein AJ, Rodríguez-Cerezo E (2010) Low-level presence of new GM crops: an issue on the 
rise for countries where they lack approval. AgBioForum 13,173 – 182. 
Stevenson JR, Villoria N, Byerlee D, Kelley T, Maredia M (2013) Green Revolution research 
saved an estimated 18 to 27 million hectares from being brought into agricultural production. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of the United States of America 110, 8363–8368. 
Tabashnik BE, Brévault T, Cannière Y (2013) Insect resistance to Bt crops: lessons from the 
first billion acres. Nature Biotechnology 31, 510–521.  
Tait J (2007) Systemic interactions in life science innovation. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management 19, 257–277. 
Tait J, Barker G (2011) Global food security and governance of modern biotechnologies. 
EMBO Reports 12, 763–768. 
Tait J, Banda G, Watkins A (2017) Proportionate and adaptive governance of innovative 
technologies (PAGIT): a framework to guide policy and regulatory decision making. Innogen 
Institute, University of Edinburgh <https://www.innogen.ac.uk/downloads/FrameworkReport-
Final_170717.pdf>   
Tillie P, Dillen K, Rodríguez-Cerezo E (2013) The pipeline of GM crops for improved animal 
feed: challenges for commercial use. In Animal Nutrition with Transgenic Plants (Ed. G 
Flachowsky) pp. 166–187. CABI, Wallingford. 
Tilman D (1999) Global environmental impacts of agricultural expansion: the need for 
sustainable and efficient practices. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 96, 5995–6000. 
Tripathi DK, Singh S, Singh S, Dubey NK, Chauhan DK (2016) Impact of nanoparticles on 
photosynthesis: challenges and opportunities. Materials Focus 5,405–411. 
Tripathi L, Tripathi JN, Kiggundu A, Korie S, Shotkoski F, Tushemereirwe WK (2014) Field 
trial of Xanthomonas wilt disease-resistant bananas in East Africa. Nature Biotechnology 32, 
868–870. 
Van Evert FK, Fountas S, Jakovetic D, Crnojevic V, Travlos I, Kempenaar C (2017) Big data 
for weed control and crop protection. Weed Research 57, 218–233. 
Van Zanten BT, Zasada I, Koetse MJ, Ungaro F, Häfner K, Verburg PH (2016) A 
comparative approach to assess the contribution of landscape features to aesthetic and 
recreational values in agricultural landscapes. Ecosystem Services 17, 87–98. 
Varshney RK, Singh VK, Hickey JM, Xun X, Marshall DF, Wang J, Edwards D, Ribaut J-M 
(2016) Analytical decision support tools for genomics assisted breeding. Trends in Plant 
Science 21, 354–363. 
Wang P, Lombi E., Zhao F-J, Kopittke PM (2016) Nanotechnology: a new opportunity in plant 
sciences. Trends in Plant Science 21, 699–712. 
Wing KD (2017) It takes a team: reflections on insecticide discoveries, toxicological problems 
and enjoying the unexpected. Pest Management Science 73, 666–671. 
Wolfert S, Ge L, Verdouw C, Bogaardt M-J (2017) Big data in smart farming – a review. 
Agricultural Systems 153, 69–80. 
Wolt JD, Wang K, Yang B (2016) The regulatory status of genome-edited crops. Plant 
Biotechnology Journal 14, 510–518. 
Yan W, Frégeau-Reid J, Martin R, Pageau D, Mitchell-Fetch J (2015) How many test 
locations and replications are needed in crop variety trials for a target region? Euphytica 202, 
36 –372. 
Zhu F, Xu J, Palli R, Ferguson J, Palli SR (2011) Ingested RNA interference for managing 
the populations of the Colorado potato beetle, Leptinotarsa decemlineata. Pest Management 
Science 67, 175–182. 
